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Abstract. Intensiﬁed European integration, enlargement of the EU, and
increasing migration activity worldwide have pushed migration and migra-
tion policy to the forefront of the European agenda. While many observers
hesitate to embrace immigration emanating from outside Europe, sectoral
skill shortages and social security systems under demographic pressure have
fostered an almost unanimous call for larger mobility within Europe. Yet,
neither does intra-European migration respond to this request, nor are the
possible consequences of increased migration activity well understood. This
paper embeds this discussion into a systematic classiﬁcation of economic mi-
gration research according to its major conceptual and applied questions.
The state of theoretical and empirical research in this literature is reviewed
brieﬂy, with a focus on intra-European migration. We conclude that the rel-
atively positive assessment of this type of migration mainly derives from its
high skill content. To prepare the prediction of future developments, we oﬀer
empirical evidence on the determinants of intra-EU-migration by an analysis
of the Eurobarometer survey. Unless information deﬁcits, traces of xenopho-
bic tendencies, and the perception of prohibitively high levels of bureaucratic
red tape are overcome, intra-European migration will not play the role it is
hoped for.
JEL-Classiﬁcation: F22, J61.
Keywords: Labor mobility, migration intention, intra-EU-migration.
* This paper is based on evidence presented to the House of Lords Select Committee F
(Social Aﬀairs, Education and Home Aﬀairs). Responsibility for the views expressed in
this paper is solely that of the authors. All correspondence to Prof. Dr. Christoph M.
Schmidt, Ph.D., Rheinisch-Westf¨ alisches Institut f¨ ur Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI-Essen),
Hohenzollernstr. 1-3, 45128 Essen, Fax: +49 201 8149236, Email: schmidt@rwi-essen.de.1 Introduction
More than ﬁfty years after World War II, societies in Europe have trans-
formed their composition to an extent that the founding fathers of a uniﬁed
Europe could not have anticipated. In particular, many societies in Europe
have been shaped by their intense and multi-faceted immigration experience,
leading to the variegated societies we observe today. Certainly, much of this
change is a reﬂection of international developments, most notably European
economic and political integration itself, but also the demise of socialism in
Eastern Europe. In particular, the projected enlargement of the EU in com-
bination with increasing migration activity worldwide has placed migration
high on the European agenda.
The importance of this issue is reﬂected in the intense debate on the mag-
nitude of prospective migration ﬂows from EU accession candidates to EU
incumbents (see e.g. Bauer and Zimmermann (1999), Fertig (2001),
Fertig and Schmidt (2001) and Sinn (1999), (2000)). The overarching
theme of this debate is the magnitude of the burden imposed on receiving
economies by immigration rather than its potential positive eﬀects. Yet,
neither is the phenomenon of migration well understood, nor is it obvious
how to predict its development into the future. Most importantly, economic
migration research frequently emphasizes the rejuvenating impact of future
immigration, its beneﬁcial eﬀect on the productivity of incumbent workers,
and on aggregate demand.
The current situation on many European labor markets is characterized
by rather high average unemployment. However, there is simultaneously a
shortage of high-qualiﬁed labor in many countries. In Germany, for instance,
the information technology sector is persistently unable to ﬁll its vacancies
out of the pool of German unemployed. Indeed, economists argue increas-
ingly for an immigration policy directed at actively recruiting highly quali-
ﬁed workers from abroad (see e.g. Zimmermann et al. (2002)). Among
migration experts there is even a growing perception that the industrial-
ized countries have been involved for a long time in a constant competition
for high-skilled workers (for an overview on high-skilled migration see e.g.
Regets (2001)).
Similarly, Europe’s societies are ageing, placing their pay-as-you-go so-
cial security systems under considerable demographic pressure. It becomes
increasingly well understood that a regulation of future immigration that is
tailored to attract young and economically successful migrants can alleviate
some of the the demographic burden associated with an ageing population,
although a major reform of these systems cannot be avoided. These consider-
ations do hold particularly for those European economies whose populations
are ageing rapidly, most prominently for Germany. Thus, while many ob-
servers still hesitate to embrace migration from outside Europe, there is an
almost unanimous call for larger mobility within Europe. At least within Eu-
1rope the legal arrangements facilitate this competition: the free movement-
agreement of the European Union, in principle, smoothes the way for labor
migration across national borders.
Yet, mobility within the European Union still seems rather low or even
negligible. The reasons for this phenomenon are unclear at present, however,
since the determinants and consequences of intra-EU migration are widely
unresearched. Neither are we confronted with an abundance of precise fore-
casts of future intra-EU mobility, as a better understanding of its underlying
factors is an indispensable prerequisite.
The aim of this paper is, therefore, to identify the major obstacles for in-
creased intra-EU migration ﬂows, particularly among the potential migrants
of the future, European youngsters. To prepare this analysis, we embed this
discussion into a systematic classiﬁcation of economic migration research ac-
cording to its major conceptual and applied questions. The state of theoret-
ical and empirical research in this literature is reviewed brieﬂy, with a focus
on intra-European migration. We conclude that unless information deﬁcits,
traces of xenophobic tendencies, and the perception of prohibitively high lev-
els of bureaucratic red tape are overcome, intra-European migration will not
play the role it is hoped for. This insight should serve as one cornerstone for
a rational economic policy on the level of the EU as well as for the individual
member states.
As a point of departure we brieﬂy survey some stylized facts on the Eu-
ropean migration experience in section 2. Furthermore, to review the the-
oretical and empirical challenges involved we outline in section 3 the state
of discussion in the received literature on economic migration research and
derive a set of interrelated research sub-ﬁelds. In our assessment these are
the research areas which have to be pursued if we want to enhance our un-
derstanding of the questions raised by migration movements. Moreover, we
provide empirical evidence on the intentions of young Europeans to work or
study abroad in section 4. Finally, section 5 oﬀers some conclusions.
2 Migration Within the EU – The Current
Situation
Is mobility within Europe too low? Most observers would agree that intr-EU
migration has not approached the levels necessary to equilibrate the tempo-
rary or structural imbalances arising across EU labor markets. The presence
of considerable migration cost at the level of the individual or the household,
as well as the remaining empirical question what magnitude of migration
might be needed to solve speciﬁc economic problems makes the assessment
of the optimal migration activity quite diﬃcult, though.
2It seems fair to argue that in the long run one problem deserves atten-
tion among all European societies, population ageing. Migration could help
to alleviate the ageing of the population (see Bonin (2001) and Schmidt
(2000) for the case of Germany). However, while intra-EU migration could
play some role in the short-run, in the medium term this alleviation is un-
likely to come from within the EU. Table 1 reveals that all heterogeneity
notwithstanding, the demographic structure of many EU countries is compa-
rable in that they all suﬀer from low birth rates and continuously increasing
life expectancy. Therefore, in the long-run it is rather unlikely that intra-EU
migration alone could suﬃce to contain the demographic burden.
Table 1: Population Movements 1999 per 1,000 Inhabitants
Country Births Deaths Natural Net Population
Population Migration* Growth
Growth
EU-15 10.7 9.9 0.7 1.9 2.6
Austria 9.7 9.7 0.0 1.1 1.1
Belgium 11.2 10.3 0.9 1.6 2.5
Denmark 12.4 11.1 1.3 1.8 3.1
Finland 11.1 9.6 1.6 0.7 2.3
France 12.6 9.2 3.4 0.8 4.3
Germany 9.3 10.3 -0.9 2.5 1.6
Greece 9.7 9.8 -0.1 2.4 2.3
Ireland 14.2 8.4 5.8 4.9 10.7
Italy 9.3 9.9 -0.6 1.8 1.2
Luxembourg 12.9 8.8 4.1 10.9 15.0
Netherlands 12.7 8.9 3.8 2.8 6.6
Portugal 11.5 10.8 0.7 1.1 1.8
Spain 9.5 9.3 0.2 1.0 1.2
Sweden 10.0 10.7 -0.7 1.5 0.8
United Kingdom 11.8 10.6 1.2 2.7 3.9
* From inside and outside the EU; Source: Eurostat (2000).
Intra-European mobility seems to be an important factor in the allevia-
tion of labor market problems, though. If labor markets were competitive
and were to work without frictions there should be no regional, no inter-
sectoral nor occupational wage diﬀerences. Such diﬀerences, however, do
exist (see Table 2). Moreover, they turn out to be highly persistent (see
e.g. DeNew and Schmidt (1994) and Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt
(1997)). Therefore, while migration within Europe could serve as a potential
adjustment mechanism, it does not serve as a major equilibrating factor so
far. By contrast, the rather low rates of intra-EU migration despite existing
wage and unemployment diﬀerentials between EU countries are striking.
Arguably, existing economic diﬀerences between countries should exhibit
the greatest incentives to migrate for younger people (say, 20 to 40 years of
age) since these cohorts should have the highest return to invest in the migra-
tion decision and the lowest cost of emigrating. Table 2 reveals that there
3is indeed substantial variation in the unemployment rates and wage earnings
for this core group of potential migrants across EU countries whereas the
population share of this age group is rather constant. Persistent imbalances
of this order of magnitude can only reﬂect high cost of moving away from the
home country. These cost comprise physic components, but also the possibly
dramatic loss of country-speciﬁc human capital. A European migration pol-
icy aiming at increasing migration activity for the sake of reducing existing
labor market imbalances might fruitfully address these various cost compo-
nents. Our own empirical analysis particularly concerns intangible costs.
Table 2: EU-15 Population and Core Age Group (age 20-40) in 1998
Country Population Core Age Unemployment Rate Average
in 1,000 Group of Core Age Earnings
in % Group in % per Hour*
EU-15 375 457.8 29.75 8.29 11.48
Austria 8 082.8 28.66 5.34 13.05
Belgium 10 213.8 29.16 12.11 10.47
Denmark 5 313.6 29.48 6.17 23.24
Finland 5 159.6 29.88 9.55 12.32
France 58 973.2 32.37 16.03 10.51
Germany 82 037.0 28.51 6.95 12.94
Greece 10 521.7 30.25 10.38 4.63
Ireland 3 734.9 30.54 10.46 9.45
Italy 57 612.6 30.34 11.20 n.a.
Luxembourg 429.2 30.52 1.90 11.14
Netherlands 15 760.2 31.00 3.41 14.91
Portugal 9 979.5 31.08 4.74 3.83
Spain 39 394.3 26.80 15.67 9.15
Sweden 8 854.3 26.85 6.06 12.00
United Kingdom 59 391.1 29.14 4.36 13.08
* In Euro in the manufacturing sector. For Denmark, Sweden and UK the ECU convergence
rates of 31 December, 1997 were used; Source: ILO (2002); own calculations.
The low level of intra-European migration activity, coupled with the high
intensity of the current debate and the uninformed argumentation of many of
its participants might suggest that Europe is a stranger to the phenomenon
of sizeable migration. However, this region possesses a rather intense migra-
tion experience, historically as well as recent. Overall, since the end of World
War II Europe as a whole underwent a transition process to an immigration
region. It had clearly been an emigration region in the 19th century (see
e.g. Chiswick and Hatton (2001)). As a consequence of this continuous
inﬂux, many European societies today contain large immigrant populations.
Moreover, second-generation migrants are a sizeable fraction of the younger
European population, shaping European society in an important way.
Table 3 demonstrates that many countries of the EU display a con-
siderable share of non-citizens in their population as well as in their labor
force. However, there is also a substantial variation among these countries.
4Neglecting the exceptional situation of Luxembourg, the average share of
non-citizens in the population of the existing EU countries is 4.65% and
the average share in the labor force amounts to 4.25%. Yet, Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, and Sweden display substantially higher non-citizen
shares, whereas the fraction of non-citizens in the population and labor force
of the Mediterranean countries, but also of the United Kingdom and Finland
are clearly lying below average. In many respects, Germany has been the
prototypical European immigration country of the post-war era.
Table 3: Foreign or Foreign-Born Population and Labor Force in Selected Euro-
pean Countries in 1996
Country Foreign Population Foreign Labor Force
Thousands % of Total Thousands % of Total
Population Labor Force
Austria 728 9.0 328 10.0
Belgium 912 9.0 341 8.1
Denmark 238 4.7 84 3.0
Finland 74 1.4 19 0.8
France 3,597 6.3 1,605 6.3
Germany 7,314 8.9 2,559 9.1
Ireland 118 3.2 52 3.5
Italy 1,096 2.0 332 1.7
Luxembourg 143 34.1 118 53.8
Netherlands 680 4.4 218 3.1
Portugal 173 1.7 87 1.8
Spain 539 1.3 162 1.0
Sweden 527 6.0 218 5.1
United Kingdom 1,972 3.4 878 3.4
Source: OECD (1998). Figures for France are for 1990. Figures for Greece not available.
In absolute terms, Germany displays the largest non-citizen community
among these countries. Table 4 reports the most current ﬁgures for the
country-of-citizenship composition of non-citizens living in Germany. The
table reveals that the majority of foreigners currently living in Germany are
citizens of a European country, with citizens of Turkey being the largest
group. Speciﬁcally, citizens of Turkey and of EU-countries comprise more
than 53% of the stock of foreigners currently residing in Germany. Together
with the states of former Yugoslavia these countries represent more than 67%
of the foreign population share. This population stock is the result of a steady
immigration of people to Germany since the end of World War II. However,
the composition of these immigration ﬂows as well as their magnitude varied
substantially over time (for more details on the historical developments for
t h ec a s eo fG e r m a n ys e ee . g .Schmidt (1996) and Schmidt and Zimmer-
mann (1992)).
5Table 4: The Composition of Non-Citizens in Germany in 2000













African Countries 299.3 4.1
American Countries 213.3 2.9
Asian Countries 213.3 11.5
Australia and Oceania 10.4 0.1
Stateless and Unknown 74.3 1.0
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2001). All ﬁgures for 31.12.2000.
Table 5: Population Share of EU- and Non-EU-Foreigners in Percent, 1985-1998
EU-Foreigners Non-EU-Foreigners
Country 1985 1990 1995 1998 1985 1990 1995 1998
EU-15 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.6 3.3 3.5
Austria n.a. 1.0 n.a. 1.2 n.a. 5.6 n.a. 7.9
Belgium 6.0 5.5 5.5 5.5 3.2 3.4 3.7 3.3
Denmark 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.4 2.2 2.9 3.7
Finland 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.3
France n.a. 2.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.0 n.a. n.a.
Germany 2.0 1.9 2.2 2.3 3.6 4.2 6.4 6.7
Greece 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 2.0 1.7 1.0 1.2
Ireland 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Italy n.a. n.a. 0.2 0.2 n.a. n.a. 1.0 1.3
Luxembourg n.a. 25.4 29.5 31.0 n.a. 3.4 3.1 3.8
Netherlands 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 2.6 3.2 3.7 3.1
Portugal 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.3
Spain 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.9
Sweden 2.6 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.1 3.0 4.1 3.9
United Kingdom 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4 2.5 2.7 2.1 2.3
* Source: Eurostat (2000).
Returning to the broader European perspective, Table 5 reveals that
workers from EU countries have accounted for a relatively steady share of
the population in the EU-15 countries over time, whereas the share of for-
eigners from Non-EU countries has been increasing considerably within the
time period from 1985 to 1998. These ﬁgures, however, do in all likelihood
6not reveal the true mobility within Europe since what is recorded as an immi-
grant or foreigner by these statistics are individuals who change their place
of residence for a longer time period. Unfortunately, these ﬁgures do not
report short-term moves of individuals working abroad for only a couple of
months. Furthermore, they do not reveal any information about cross-border
commuters or seasonal workers. It is, therefore, very likely that the ﬁgures
in Table 5 paint only part of the overall picture on mobility within the Eu-
ropean Union. They rather place lower bounds on the phenomenon.
Consequently, common perceptions and traditional recording of migra-
tion may be an inappropriate description of current population movements.
To provide a more encompassing view, it is necessary to consider current
and future forms of any kind of cross-border movements, their relationship
to individual behavior, their relationship to more integrated economies and
to new forms of technology and communication. Not the least reason for this
widened attention is that the process of integration of immigrants is in all
likelihood closely related to the (expected) duration of migration (see e.g.
Dustmann (1996)). Understanding the reasons for diﬀerent forms of mo-
bility is also one of the key elements for analyzing the economic performance
of temporary and permanent migrants as well as their economic impact on
both the origin and the destination country’s societies.
The following section aims at providing a common frame of reference
for answering these questions in the context of economic migration research
together with a brief review of the contributions of this research. This dis-
cussion prepares our analysis of the migration intentions of young Europeans
presented in section 4 and embeds it conceptually into received migration
research.
3 W h a tD oW eK n o w ?
For an assessment of the determinants and consequences of current and future
intra-European migration, it is helpful to proceed along the lines of a clear
conceptual framework. Naturally, there is no unique, all-encompassing theo-
retical model linking together all aspects of the diﬀerent topics of economic
migration research. However, it is possible to outline a conceptual framework
which provides the brackets for the discussion of the interrelated and complex
issues of economic migration research. This conceptualization demonstrates
that the questions raised by diﬀerent strands of migration research are closely
related to one another, and to many other aspects of economic policy.
73.1 The Conceptual Framework
Economic research concerning migration issues can be conceptualized into
three broad ﬁelds. These ﬁelds may be described most sensibly by the fol-
lowing set of research questions:
1. Which factors determine the decision to migrate, i.e. which are the
motives or driving forces behind observed immigration ﬂows? Natu-
rally, since the decision to migrate is in all likelihood the outcome of a
systematic process, the characteristics of those who decide to relocate
from their original home to a new destination are hardly a random
sample of the indigenous population of either country. Understanding
the composition of migration ﬂows seems therefore to be an important
prerequisite for the analysis both of migrant performance and the im-
pact of immigration, which are the remaining two aspects of economic
migration research.
2. Which factors determine the economic performance of immigrants in
the destination country, i.e. do migrants’ wages, employment prospects
or the risk to depend on welfare payments converge or diverge to those
of comparable natives as the duration of residence unfolds and what are
the reasons for these developments? What structural explanation can
be oﬀered for the observed convergence or divergence patterns, i.e. is it
assimilation or discrimination? Related aspects are the determinants
of the perception of as well as the attitudes towards immigrants by the
native population in the destination country.
3. Which factors determine the economic impact of immigration on the
destination country as a whole or on the population indigenous to the
destination country, i.e. does immigration, for instance, exhibit a sig-
niﬁcant impact on the age structure of the destination country’s society
or does it reduce the wages or employment prospects of, say, low-skilled
natives or resident migrants of preceding entry cohorts, and if so, what
are the mechanisms at work?
These three areas are interrelated with one another and exhibit a close con-
nection to immigration policy. Clearly, the composition of immigration ﬂows
can, at least in principle, be regulated by diﬀerent policy regimes yielding a
diﬀerent skill or country-of-origin mix of observable inﬂows. Since formal and
informal human capital endowments determine the economic performance of
immigrants in the destination country and the transferability of these en-
dowments may vary with the country of origin, immigration policy therefore
plays a decisive role for the economic performance of immigrants. Moreover,
economic prospects of immigrants, the impact of immigration on the desti-
nation countries’ economies and the perception of migrants by the natives
are certainly closely related and might exhibit repercussions on the decision
of potential migrants to enter the country.
83.2 The State of Discussion
This sub-section brieﬂy collects the salient aspects of the available evidence
on this trinity of migration research. It becomes transparent that migrants’
skills are perhaps the central theme of all migration research and, conse-
quently, of migration policy.
The Migration Decision
The traditional approach to explaining aggregate migration ﬂows departs at
diﬀerential developments of economic activity (per capita), unemployment
rates and other socio-demographic factors, such as geographic distance, a
common history or common language (see e.g. Harris and Todaro (1970)
for a seminal paper; Fertig (2001) and Vogler and Rotte (2001) are
applications for the case of Germany). Pinning down any stable relationship
between the economic factors and immigration activities has been notori-
ously diﬃcult throughout this literature. This has made the creation of a
satisfactory connection between the in parts overwhelmingly sophisticated
economic theory of the migration decision and the - at best - scarce evidence
for the validity of its predictions a very frustrating endeavor.
Fertig and Schmidt (2000) take a completely diﬀerent approach at
modelling aggregate immigration activity, with the principal aim of fore-
casting net immigration into the future. In this study, the crucial role of
demographics for migration activity is placed in the focus of the discussion.
It has been demonstrated in numerous empirical analyses of migration ac-
tivity - historical as well as recent - that migrants tend to move from origin
to destination at young prime age. Thus, the relative prevalence of this age
group in the population at the origin is necessarily a major determinant of
the actual migration potential and, in consequence, activity from this source.
On the basis of these considerations, Fertig and Schmidt (2000) con-
clude that even if EU enlargement were to lift all legal obstacles for East-
West migration, the ensuing migration ﬂows would likely be only of moderate
magnitude. For the discussion of this paper, this approach suggests that un-
derstanding the attitudes of European youngsters towards mobility across
national borders is the key to an enlightened discussion of the future intra-
European migration.
The Economic Performance of Migrants
For any reliable assessment of the economic impact of migration, the assim-
ilation process of migrants in the destination country is of central concern.
The focus of economic migration research has been on a single aspect of this
process, relative wage dynamics of migrant workers throughout their labor
market career. It has been demonstrated in numerous studies (see among
others Dustmann (1993) and Schmidt (1997) for Germany) that skills
play a dominant role for immigrant performance, whether acquired in formal
curriculae as secondary or post-secondary schooling and vocational training,
9or informally as experience in the labor market, or as manifestation of in-
trinsic personal traits such as cognitive ability or motivation.
In general, migrants acquire productive capacity in their origin country,
but only part of this human capital can be transferred to the labor market at
the destination. Consequently, the young adults arriving at their new home
posses a lower earnings capacity, and consequently relatively low wages. Over
their time of residence, they tend to acquire the lacking human capital, such
as the language spoken at the destination - their low initial earnings capac-
ity implies that the opportunity cost of their investment are relatively low,
making substantial human capital acquisition likely. For young, typically
relatively skilled European migrants one might expect a high transferability
of human capital and therefore a ﬂat wage proﬁle on equal footing with the
wages of equally skilled native workers.
The empirical controversies remaining are of technical nature. Most re-
ceived econometric analyses on the relative labor market performance of mi-
grants rest their interpretation on a crucial, and typically completely undis-
cussed, identiﬁcation assumption. Wage diﬀerences can only be used as a
perfect measure of disparities in economic productivity, if the labor market
functions without any trace of discrimination and any legal barriers to wage
parity. On the other hand, following several recent analyses in interpret-
ing any unexplained wage diﬀerential as a reﬂection of discrimination would
require an equally strong and hardly more plausible implicit identiﬁcation
assumption - the absence of migrant-native diﬀerences in productive capac-
ity once formal characteristics are controlled for.
The key to understanding how these two types of interpretation might
both be compatible with the same data lies in the insight that both of
them rest on empirically untestable identiﬁcation assumptions. That is, they
rest on assumptions maintained to hold true to allow the interpretation of
reduced-form wage dynamics in terms of structural ideas, assimilation or
discrimination. Therefore, the decisive problem is: what is the valid identi-
ﬁcation assumption? This question cannot be answered unequivocally and
must remain a matter of economic reasoning alone.
Similar considerations pertain to that aspect of research on immigrant
assimilation which has received most attention in the North-American de-
bate on immigrant assimilation – the role of cohort eﬀects. It has been
argued adamantly by Borjas (1987), (1991) and discussed intensely by
subsequent analysts (see e.g. LaLonde and Topel (1991) and Yuengert
(1994)) that the inherent productive capacity of immigrant cohorts to the
United States varies drastically over time. Speciﬁcally, the extent of this
variation and its link to changes in the legal setting are at issue. Again, a
fundamental identiﬁcation problem arises, since the impact of economic as-
similation, the aﬃliation with varying cohorts, and the eﬀect of a changing
wage distribution cannot be identiﬁed separately without further identiﬁca-
10tion assumptions.
The Economic Impact of Immigration
The empirical assessment of relative individual economic performance is
straightforward as a conceptual issue. It is a matter of direct comparison of
an appropriate outcome measure, i.e. wages or employment success, between
the individuals of interest - migrants - and a comparison group - natives. By
contrast, the economic impact of immigration unfolds in an indirect fashion
via market reactions, and is therefore much more complex as an object of
investigation.
Conceptually, additional immigration shifts the relevant labor supply
curve outward - with the ﬁrst problem for any empirical strategy arising
as the question what exactly is ”relevant”, the local labor market, the skill
group etc.? The consequences, in terms of employment and wages for this
relevant group, as well as for all other groups of labor - with unskilled native
workers being the most prominent case in the public debate - are ﬁrst of all
a matter of the relative own elasticities of demand and supply and of the set
of elasticities of complementarity with all other production factors. An equi-
librating intra-European migration that reacts to imbalances of supply and
demand of speciﬁc skills is likely to be beneﬁcial on two accounts. Firstly,
since it reacts to skill shortage, it is unlikely to crowd out comparable native
labor. And secondly, skilled workers often tend to be complementary produc-
tion factors to unskilled native workers, lifting their labor market prospects
as well.
Yet, the additional labor supply is only part of the story, since product
demand, and thus labor demand (on all other sub-markets) tend to be af-
fected positively. On balance, it might not be the case at all that immigration
harms any group of native workers, even if substitutivity with native labor
is important. In fact, the matter is entirely empirical. Nevertheless, even at
the theoretical level many facets relevant for the real world might complicate
the analysis, for instance the necessity to account for an increasing variety
of products via immigration, or the consequences of institutionalized wage
rigidities (see Schmidt et al. (1994)).
The empirical challenge induced in this line of research is to isolate
immigration-induced shifts in labor supply which can be treated as if they
were set in an ideal experiment, in other words as exogenous. Several strate-
gies can be found in the literature regarding the deﬁnition of the appropriate
sub-market. All these analyses face the common problem of non-experimental
research: the extent of additional immigration does not vary randomly across
time and space, as in a laboratory experiment, but is rather the outcome of
systematic forces. Speciﬁcally, more attractive destinations will typically
generate a larger inﬂux of immigrants. Comparing the relevant economic
outcome measures, native employment rates say, across regions will typically
confuse the impact of immigration with the underlying reason making the
11area particularly attractive.
For the case of Europe, empirical evidence on the economic impact of
immigration (see among others Bauer (1998), Haisken-DeNew (1996),
Hunt (1992) and Pischke and Velling (1997)) suggests that the deriva-
tion of robust qualitative results is a diﬃcult, if not hopeless task, given
the nature of the data material, and the inherent heterogeneity of the phe-
nomenon. As a tentative summary, it seems apparent that any displacement
eﬀects of additional migration are small in magnitude, with zero being a
plausible point estimate. So far it has not been possible to quantify any of
the presumably positive demand side eﬀects working via goods markets, let
alone indirect (positive) eﬀects of increasing variety of products and services,
or (negative) eﬀects of excessive crowding on the housing market.
Performance and Impact: The Welfare State
One of the most contentious issues in this context regards the welfare state.
The concern over this problem in principle reﬂects legitimate reservations
about the ﬁscal and political viability of a welfare state potentially acting as
a magnet to migrants, yet being underwritten by a native electorate. Most of
the research on this topic has been conducted in the US and Canada. How-
ever, neither the empirical results regarding the trends in immigrant welfare
nor the institutional arrangements shaping the environment for immigrants’
welfare use are easily translated from North America to the European con-
text. Most of all, the historical developments governing size and composition
of immigrant inﬂux to Europe were quite distinct.
An interesting piece of evidence for the case of the US is provided by
the study of Levine and Zimmermann (1999). They utilize the quasi-
laboratory nature provided by the idiosyncratically acting US states to ap-
proximate as close as possible an appropriately designed experiment. In sum,
they ﬁnd little evidence for the welfare magnet hypothesis. Unfortunately,
despite its importance for the assessment of the impact of immigration, the
empirical literature for Europe is rather scarce, with Blundell et al.
(1988) for the UK and Fertig and Schmidt (2001) for the Germany be-
ing two of a few exceptions.
In particular, the latter study suggests that, while the population of non-
citizens in Germany indeed displays a relatively large welfare dependence,
this relative pattern is turned on its head when one compares genuinely
comparable individuals. That is, the apparently high welfare dependence of
migrants is a reﬂection of the guest-worker recruitment policy of the late
1960’s and early 1970’s – mainly seeking to attract unskilled workers and
their families. It is not a reﬂection of low intrinsic qualities, but rather of the
continuing importance of formal skills on the German labor market. Con-
sequently, as the typical skill content of intra-European migration is high,
welfare dependence promises to remain a minor issue in this debate.
124 The Migration Intentions of Young Euro-
peans – Some Evidence
For the case of mobility within Europe empirical evidence on the determi-
nants of cross-border moves is rather scarce. In order to present some descrip-
tive, but quite suggestive evidence we analyze the Eurobarometer, a public
opinion survey of social and political attitudes conducted on behalf of the Eu-
ropean Commission two or more times a year in all member states of the EU.
Speciﬁcally, in our analysis we utilize the second wave of the 1997 Eu-
robarometer survey conducted among young European between 15 and 24
years of age at the time of the interview. This wave of the survey aims at
providing a portrait on the personal life situation of young Europeans, their
organizational membership and activities as well as their attitudes towards
social problems, foreign people, and employment issues. Furthermore, these
young people were asked for their perception of the European Union and the
possibilities to work or study abroad. We would like to emphasize that these
respondents who were brought up at a time in which the idea of a uniﬁed
Europe had already been widely recognized and was established in institu-
tional terms to a fair degree.
Here we utilize the answer distribution of French, German and UK youth
to analyze the correlates of the attitudes of these young people towards mo-
bility in a wider sense. A description of the explanatory variables in our
analysis is provided in Table A1 in the appendix. Table A2 provides some
summary statistics. As a starting, point Table 6 displays the results from
our analysis of the question “Which of the following, do you think ‘being a
citizen of the European Union’ means?”. Speciﬁcally, we analyze the cor-
relates of the answer “The right to work in any country in the European
Union” by individual respondents in a discrete choice framework. The ta-
ble presents the marginal eﬀects of each coeﬃcient estimate which can be
interpreted straightforwardly as the reaction of the probability to agree in
response to a unit-increase of the right-hand variables.
13Table 6: Being a Citizen of the EU Means the Right to Work in any Country in
the EU
Explanatory Variable Marginal Effect t-value
German Nationality 0.1213 5.23
French Nationality 0.1220 4.90
Speaks Foreign Language -0.0068 -0.30
Visited Foreign Country 0.0312 1.51
Being Female -0.0332 -1.77
Still Studying 0.0477 2.40
Xenophobic Tendency -0.0658 -1.88
Parents are Unemployed -0.0495 -1.05
Parents have a High Degree of Education 0.0501 2.14
Number of observations: 2,695. The reference category for the nationality
indicator is United Kingdom.
Our estimation results suggest that ceteris paribus German and French
youth exhibit a statistically signiﬁcant higher probability to choose this an-
swer category. The probability is approximately 12% higher than that of
UK youth. One might speculate that the rather high degree of scepticism
regarding the idea of a uniﬁed Europe is transmitted from the older to the
younger generation in the UK. Furthermore, young Europeans who are still
studying or who have a highly educated parental background also tend to
agree with this answer independently of the nationality. In these cases the
probability to agree increases by approximately 5% each. While these eﬀect
is shy of being signiﬁcant, the negative association between an agreement
with the proposed statement and a self-reported xenophobic tendency seems
noteworthy. It would certainly not be too surprising to ﬁnd xenophobia and
a low level of information on basic facts regarding foreign nations and their
citizens to go hand in hand.
Table 7 extends the analysis further and reports the results of an analysis
of the question “Let’s suppose you want to work or study abroad, what, do
you think, would be the main diﬃculty you would face?”. There were several
answer possibilities including “I would have language diﬃculties” or “I would
be homesick” from which the young respondents had to choose exactly one.
We analyze the correlates of the answers “I would have administrative dif-
ﬁculties” and “I would have diﬃculties to get my qualiﬁcations recognized”
which we combined into one category.
14Table 7: The Perception of the Diﬃculties of Working Abroad
Explanatory Variable Marginal Effect t-value
German Nationality -0.0014 -0.13
French Nationality 0.0615 4.45
Speaks Foreign Language 0.0531 5.07
Visited Foreign Country 0.0209 2.26
Being Female -0.0033 -0.40
Still Studying -0.0050 -0.57
Xenophobic Tendency 0.0114 0.73
Parents are Unemployed -0.0487 -2.17
Parents have a High Degree of Education 0.0002 0.02
Number of observations: 2,695. The reference category for the nationality
indicator is United Kingdom.
Table 7 reveals that ceteris paribus French respondents display a statis-
tically signiﬁcant higher probability of 6 percentage points to agree relatively
to respondents from the UK whereas the perception of German youth does
not diﬀer from that of UK youth. It would be interesting to ﬁnd out whether
the perception of French youth is associated with the rather complex and
selective French school system. Surprisingly, respondents which are able to
speak a foreign language, as well as respondents who had gathered some ex-
perience with foreign countries by visiting them also exhibit a statistically
higher probability to believe that there will be administrative diﬃculties
involved in the decision to work abroad. Finally, respondents with unem-
ployed parents display a signiﬁcantly lower probability to agree since their
main obstacle might rather lie in ﬁnancial restrictions than in administrative
diﬃculties.
Table 8 displays the results of our analysis of the (spontaneous) an-
swer “I am not interested in working or studying abroad” on the question
“Let’s suppose you want to work or study abroad, what, do you think, would
be the main diﬃculty you would face?” The results presented in Table 8
suggest that ceteris paribus German respondents are less willing to work or
study abroad compared to young respondents from the United Kingdom and
France. Young Europeans displaying xenophobic tendencies are also less will-
ing to move abroad whereas individuals who already had been to a foreign
country tend to disagree with this answer.
15Table 8: No Interest in Working or Studying Abroad
Explanatory Variable Marginal Effect t-value
German Nationality 0.1010 7.45
French Nationality 0.0070 0.46
Speaks Foreign Language -0.0190 -1.72
Visited Foreign Country -0.0391 -3.88
Being Female -0.0142 -1.63
Still Studying -0.0118 -1.28
Xenophobic Tendency 0.0441 2.66
Parents are Unemployed 0.0125 0.61
Parents have a High Degree of Education -0.0119 -1.09
Number of observations: 2,695. The reference category for the nationality
indicator is United Kingdom.
The evidence presented in the preceding tables is clearly of a descrip-
tive nature and, therefore, cannot be interpreted in causal terms. Moreover,
since the respondents were quite young at the time of the interview, the opin-
ions expressed by them might change considerably over time as they mature.
However, these results may well serve as a starting point for further research
aiming at the analysis of the determinants of mobility of European individ-
uals. Individual-level studies are certainly the conceptually most promising
approach to receive a better understanding of these determinants than the
usually conducted aggregate level studies. In studies at the aggregate level it
is hardly possible to disentangle the complex aspects of the decision to work
or study abroad. As a ﬁrst conclusion we would argue that unless information
deﬁcits, traces of xenophobic tendencies, and the perception of prohibitively
high levels of bureaucratic red tape are overcome, intra-European migration
will not play the role it is hoped for.
5 Conclusions – What Remains to Be Done?
The implications of the insights presented above are twofold. Firstly, the
results suggest that for the case of Europe we are still in need of generating
more empirical evidence on some of the most important questions of migra-
tion research. Researchers will hardly be able to complete this task without
access to additional, individual-based data material. In light of this topic’s
importance for the future of the European society, it is hoped that any ini-
tiative to collect such data will be funded generously, and that policy makers
and administrators alike will support such an endeavor.
It has to be the explicit aim of future research to aid in understanding the
interplay between immigrant economic attainment and Europe’s transition
into a service-sector dominated and integrated economy. Among the speciﬁc
aspects to be addressed by such a joint research are:
16• Discrimination and ethnic concentration: Do immigrants to diﬀer-
ent European countries experience measurable discrimination in their
wages and in employment opportunities given their human capital en-
dowments, does this impact on their unemployment experience or wel-
fare dependence and what is the role of ethnic concentration in these
processes?
• Internal migration and the development of ethnic enclaves: Are the
mobility patterns of individuals in Europe a reﬂection of the regional
dispersion of job opportunities or of a tendency to develop and to ben-
eﬁt from the formal or informal networks of ethnic enclaves?
• Immigration policy, citizenship and participation in the political pro-
cess: What are the various policies enacted across Europe to deal with
the problem of integration of immigrants, which additional policies
could be suggested, and which eﬀects do the actual and the proposed
policies have on the integration of those migrants?
Secondly, this research has to be conducted from a pronounced European
perspective, i.e. as cross-country comparisons over time, relying on a com-
mon frame of reference. Such an ambitious task can hardly be performed by
a handful of researchers alone. Instead, it is necessary to co-ordinate these
endeavors on a European basis. In the light of the overwhelming relevance
of these topics, it is hoped that representatives and institutions of the Eu-
ropean Union will spend more eﬀort in supporting the development of more
and better knowledge on issues decisive for the future development of Euro-
pean societies.
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Table A1: Description of Explanatory Variables
Variable Description
German Nationality* Takes the value of 1 if the respondent is a citizen of Germany;
0o t h e r w i s e
French Nationality* Takes the value of 1 if the respondent is a citizen of France;
0o t h e r w i s e
Speaks Foreign Language Takes the value of 1 if the respondent reported foreign
language skills; 0 otherwise
Visited Foreign Country Takes the value of 1 if the respondent reported that he/she
has visited a foreign country within the last two years
before the interview; 0 otherwise
Being Female Takes the value of 1 if the respondent is female;
0o t h e r w i s e
Still Studying Takes the value of 1 if the respondent reported that he/she is
still studying; 0 otherwise
Xenophobic Tendency Takes the value of 1 if the respondent reported that he/she
feels uneasy in the presence of people of another
nationality, race, religion, or culture; 0 otherwise
Parents are Unemployed Takes the value of 1 if the respondent reported that his/her
parents are unemployed; 0 otherwise
Parents have a Takes the value of 1 if the respondent reported that his/her
High Degree of Education parents have a high schooling degree; 0 otherwise
* Therefore, the reference category for the nationality indicator is the United Kingdom.
21Table A2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Standarderror
Dependent Variables:
Ability to go wherever I want 0.4186 0.4934
Not interested in studying/working abroad 0.0724 0.2591
Administrative Diﬀculties 0.0660 0.2484
Right to work in any EU country 0.6312 0.4826
Explanatory Variables:
German Nationality 0.4430 0.4968
French Nationality 0.2694 0.4437
Speaks Foreign Language 0.7239 0.4471
Visited Foreign Country 0.6549 0.4755
Being Female 0.4980 0.5001
Still Studying 0.5046 0.5001
Xenophobic Tendency 0.0798 0.2710
Parents are Unemployed 0.0427 0.2022
Parents have a High Degree of Education 0.2219 0.4156
* All variables are categorical. Number of observations: 2,695.
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